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RECOGNIZING SUBSTANCE: ADOPTEES AND
AFFILIATES OF NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES

CLAIMING FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
Brett Anderson'

I. INTRODUCTION

It is not surprising to see widespread and far reaching governmental
regulations due to the current regulatory welfare state that characterizes our
federal government.' More and more frequently the actions of the government
3
directly affect, regulate, or otherwise modify diverse aspects of human affairs.
Sometimes the regulations are beneficial and welcomed; other times,
governmental actions constrain and impinge upon fundamental rights of
individuals.4 For many, the widespread governmental regulations undesirably
attack a very personal realm of individual life - religious freedom, the right
to freely exercise religion.5 One example of this is the Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act (BGEPA) 6 and its impact on the religious practices of Native
Americans. 7

Many Native Americans use eagle feathers in their religious ceremonies
and practices. However, the BGEPA makes it unlawful to "possess... [or]
transport.. .at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle commonly known as
the American eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part nest, or egg
thereof of the foregoing eagles."9 Standing alone, the proscriptions of 16
U.S.C. § 668 appear to eliminate entirely this indispensable article from Native

I. Candidate for J.D. May 2001, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
2. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.H., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
3. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) ("It is true that activities of individuals, even
when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power
to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated
powers."). See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878) (recognizing Congress's
power to ban polygamy in order to prohibit "actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order").
4. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (addressing
government's interests in eradicating sex discrimination and preserving rights of free exercise of religion).
5. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (stating "religion is an individual
experience").
6. 16 U.S.C. § 668.
7. See infra part IV.
8. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740-42 (1986) (recognizing importance of eagles in
Native American religious ceremonies).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 668.
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American religious practices."0 To accommodate the "religious purposes of
Indian tribes," Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue
permits which allow the holder of the permit to possess eagles or eagle parts
with impunity."
This specific instance of legislative accommodation provides a legal
means for many Native Americans to more fully follow the dictates of their
religious convictions. 2 However, the Native American religious exemption,
and more specifically, the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the
Interior that govern the issuance of permits, unnecessarily deny permits to
some individuals whose beliefs and affiliation with a Native American tribe
are substantially consistent with those individuals who do qualify for a permit
and for whom the religious exemption was created. 3
For example, non-Native Americans who have been adopted into a Native
American family or who significantly affiliate with a tribe, but whose names
do not appear on the tribal rolls, 4 are unable to obtain a pennit to posses eagle
feathers under the BGEPA. 5 The denial of a permit occurs despite the
applicant's religious convictions and associations with a Native American
tribe.' 6 This under-inclusive effect is primarily the result of the criteria set
forth by the Department of the Interior in 50 C.F.R. § 22.1' Specifically, to be
eligible for a permit, the regulations require the applicant to attach a
certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that is federally recognized under
the Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 479a-1. 8 For
some adoptees or affiliates this is a difficult, and sometimes impossible,
10. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56 (1979) (stating that proscriptions are "sweepingly framed"
and "exhaustive").
11. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 740 (acknowledging exemption "for the religious purposes of Indian
tribes").
12. See id. at 744-45 (discussing Interior Department's regulations limiting permits to "individual
Indians who are authentic, bona fide practitioners" of the Native American religion).
13. See, e.g., Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding denial of permit to full
blooded Native American because the applicant's name was not listed on roll of federally recognized tribe).
14. There may be a number of reasons an individual who associates with or who may even be
adopted into a Native American family is still not recognized by the tribe as a full fledged member, thereby
precluding the inclusion of the individuals name on the tribal roll. For example, in Cherokee Intermarriage
Cases v. United States, 203 U.S. 76, 88 (1906) the Court recognized the distinctions between different
classes of citizens of the Cherokee Nation. The Court discussed the incongruity between the property rights
of a white citizen brought into the tribe by marriage as opposed to a member of the tribe by blood. Id. at
88-89. Accordingly, it appears that a tribe may desire the association with an individual and may consider
the person a member of the tribe for many purposes, yet still not include the individual's name on the tribal
rolls because the tribe wishes to otherwise limit the rights and privileges appertaining to fully recognized
membership. See, e.g., id. (classifying members of tribe).
15. See infra part IV (discussing inability of adoptee to lawfully possess eagle feathers).
16. See, e.g., Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1257 (disregarding applicant's status as Native American and
degree of religious conviction when affirming denial of permit).
17. See id. at 1257 (citing regulation as requiring certification of enrollment in appropriate tribe).
18. 50 C.F.R. §22.22(a)(5). See Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1257 (quoting approvingly 50 C.F.R.
22.22(a)(5)).
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criterion to satisfy. In certain situations, these applicants are denied permits
despite the fact that they are substantitively similarly situated to qualifying
applicants.'9
An additional obstacle is found in 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(2): the
government is authorized, when deciding to issue a permit, to consider
"[w]hether the applicant is an Indian who is authorized to participate in bona
fide tribal religious ceremonies. "20 Implicit in this inquiry is a grant of
authority to the agency to consider the applicants status as an "Indian.'
Because there is no satisfactory correlation between one's race and religious
beliefs, the ability of a government employee to utilize this discretion threatens
the applicant with a result that is arbitrary and unguided. 22 Because the
religious exemption in the BGEPA is designed to accommodate Indian tribes,
the tribes should be empowered to regulate and determine who should be
eligible for the permits.23 This result would allow qualified and deserving
applicants to receive permits, ensuring that eligibility is tied to the substance
of the religious exemption and not on a formalistic conclusion based on factors
not necessarily relating to the purpose of the religious accommodation.
Accordingly, I contend that the agency's authority to calculate the
applicant's race into the equation introduces an unnecessary, and potentially
invidious, avenue of discretion that is not necessary to carry out the purposes
of the BGEPA.24 When this grant of discretion is coupled with the tribal
enrollment requirement, a small but distinct class of applicants are improperly
precluded from obtaining permits to possess eagles or eagle parts.25 I believe
this under-inclusion is improper because the government's action infringes on
these denied applicants' free exercise rights, by making illegal any use or
possession of eagles or eagle parts for religious ceremonies. 2
19. See Gibson, 72 F. Supp.2d 1356, 1357 (S.D. Ha. 1999) (recognizing Native American
applicant's inability to verify tribal membership due to governments probable role in forcibly relocating his
ancestors).
20. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(2).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Morrison v. Garraghty, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1754 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting proposition that religion can be defined by race or heritage); Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred
Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1086 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(stating that race and religion cannot be used as a proxy for required employment skills under Title V1I).
23. See generally Pres. Mem. of April 29, 1994,59 Fed. Reg. 22953 (requesting agencies to "expand
efforts to involve Native American tribes, organizations, and individuals in the distribution process").
24. See generally Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 859 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (decrying use
of race in making parole decisions as unconstitutional invidious discrimination); McLaughlin v. State of
Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964) ("When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.").
25. See infra part IV.
26. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)
(striking down ordinances as either overbroad or underinclusive under the First Amendment).
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This is a classic form over substance problem." An applicant can be
denied a permit to possess eagle parts solely because the applicants name does
not appear on the roll of a federally recognized tribe, or possibly because the
applicant is not an Indian.' This result occurs regardless of the applicant's
degree of religious conviction and beliefs in accordance with the "religious
purposes of Indian tribes" exception in the BGEPA. 29 Also ignored are the
applicant's affiliation and socialization with a tribe, which in many respects,
are substantially identical to those of qualifying applicants.30 To remedy these
existing or potential threats on religious practices, I recommend the BGEPA
and 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 be amended to remove the requirement of certified
tribal enrollment and the avenue of bureaucratic discretion to consider race
when deciding to issue permits.
Illustrative of the unwarranted harm created by the enrollment requirement
and the race discretion feature of the regulations is the case of a Caucasian
male who claimed to have been adopted into a Native American family and to
be a practicing member of the Native American religion. 3 This individual was
recently arrested for possession of eagle feathers without a permit.
A. United States v. Samuel Ray Wilgus, Jr.2
On June 5, 1998, during a routine traffic stop, 50-year-old Samuel Wilgus
was found with 137 eagle feathers33 stored in a box in the back of his truck.34
The traffic stop resulted in an information which charged Mr. Wilgus with two
27. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, --, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2546 (2000) (declining to exalt form
over substance).
28. See Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1257 (denying permit because applicant's name was not on tribal roll).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. For the purposes of this article, the terms adoption or adoptee refer to an individual who was
adopted into a Native American family. This article will also discuss affiliates, those individuals who may
or may not have been adopted into a Native American family but nonetheless significantly associate and
affiliate with members of a Native American family or tribe. Adoptees and affiliates may also be duly
recognized by the tribe as members, but this article will proceed on the assumption that they are not certified
members.
32. United States v. Wilgus, No.2:99CR00047W (D. Utah 1999) (unreported opinion).
33. Of the 64 species of eagles worldwide, the bald and golden eagles are the only two species of
eagles that live in North America. Ella Sorensen, Eagles; Utah's Bald Eagles are Thriving, S.L. TRtBUNE,
Jan. 5, 1999, at C1. Thus, in this article, any general reference to eagles, refers to either the bald or golden
eagle, both of which are covered by the BGEPA.
34. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Information at I [hereinafter
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss]. The officer who conducted the search acknowledged that the search was
performed without permission. Bob Mims, Battle Lines Drawn in Federal Eagle Feather Case, S.L.
TRIBUNE, July 29, 1999, at B2 [hereinafter Minis, Battle Lines]. Four days after the traffic stop, several
more feathers were obtained by a Division of Wildlife Resources officer from Mr. Wilgus' wife, Linda, at
her home. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1. All the feathers owned by Mr. Wilgus were allegedly given
to him as gifts from Wilford Jake and other Native Americans. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2.
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counts of violating 16 U.S.C. § 668, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
(BFEPA).3 5 Mr. Wilgus claimed that he could lawfully possess the feathers
based on religious freedom grounds.36 He asserted that he had been adopted
into the Native American Jake family and had become a practicing member of
the Native American Church.37
Essentially, Mr. Wilgus argued that, although ethnologically he is not38a
Native American, by virtue of his adoption into a Native American family,
legally, he should be considered as member of the Paiute tribe and entitled to
the religious rights and privileges of its members.39 More specifically, he
35. 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq. The pertinent portion of the BGEPA prohibits the possession, sale, and
transportation of any eagle, or parts thereof, unless the owner has a permit as provided in 16 U.S.C. § 668(a).
16 U.S.C. § 668. Native Americans are specifically listed as parties forwhom permits are provided by the
BGEPA. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a).
36. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4.
37. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2-3. The Jake family belongs to the Paiute tribe. Id. The
late Minnie John Jake allegedly adopted Mr. Wilgus approximately 12 years ago. Id. at 2. Minnie's son
and Paiute holy man, Wilford Jake, substantiates the adoption, characterizing it as a form of "spiritual
adoption" that has been practiced for "hundreds of years" by the Paiute tribe. Mims, Battle Lines, supra
note 17. Describing the adoption, Wilford stated "(i]t was like the old Indian ways, no papers... [hie's my
brother - my adopted brother." Minis, Eagle Feather,supra note 13. Minnie was described as "a very
traditional person" and the adoption was "literally on her deathbed." Id.
38. Adoption into a tribe or Native American family is a longstanding practice and instances of
adoptions are discussed in cases dating back to 1896. See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896)
(discussing Cherokee treaty of July 19, 1866 (14 Stat. 779-803) that recognized the jurisdiction of Indian
tribunals over adopted members of the tribe). Adoptions raise a number of significant issues concerning
property rights, see Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906) (recognizing tribe's authority to
classify different types of membership and respective property rights); see also U.S. ex rel. West v.
Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80 (1907) (noting government has power over membership when allotments and federal
funds are involved), federal jurisdiction, see Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1857) (denying the
federal courts jurisdiction ina murder case because the victim, a white man, was duly adopted into the
Cherokee Tribe), criminal law see id., family law, see Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th
Cir. Colo. 1957) (holding no jurisdiction to hear claim of daughter of full blooded Native American member
of tribe); Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721, (Sth Cir. Indian Terr. 1897) (discussing adoption of a non-Native
American into tribe by marriage); and tribal sovereignty and free exercise claims, see Gibson v. Babbitt, 72
F. Supp.2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (discussing tribal membership and free exercise rights of Native
Americans).
39. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 3 (recognizing that Mr. Wilgus "is white"). In fact, Mr.
Wilgus claims that his actual ancestry is unknown. Interview with Joseph P. Orifici, Attorney for Mr.
Wilgus, in Salt Lake City, Utah (Nov. 15, 1999).
At the conclusion of oral arguments on the motion to dismiss the information, Judge Winder denied the
motion from the bench, agreeing with the government that Mr. Wilgus is not an Indian and not a member
of a federally recognized tribe. Bob Mins, Adopted PaiuteCan'tHave Feathers, S.L TRIBUNE, Aug. 10,
1999, at B I [hereinafter Mims, Can't Have Eagle Feathers]. The government provided an affidavit from
tribal Chairwomen General Anderson, averring that Mr. Wilgus was not on the Paiute membership rolls.
Affidavit in Support of Misdemeanor Information, United States v. Wilgus (D. Utah 1999) (No.
2:99CR0004W) cited inBrief in Response to Motion to Dismiss at 5. Furthermore, Assistant U.S. Attorney
Christopher Chancy relied upon the constitution of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah, Article I,Section I(c),
which sets forth the requirements for adoption into the tribe. Id.
In pertinent part the Paiute Constitution requires that:
(1)
The adoption was granted by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (2) The applicant is fourfourths (4/4) degree [sic] Indian blood from a federally recognized Indian tribe; and (3) The
applicant has resided within the Counties of Millard, Sevier, Iron, Beaver or Washington at least
five (5) years prior to applying for membership; and (4) The applicant's name has been
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argued that he is entitled to possess eagle feathers pursuant to the exemption
provided in 16 U.S.C. § 668(a), which allows Native Americans to possess
eagle feathers for religious purposes."
Mr. Wilgus alleged that his "beliefs are that of the Native American
church."' Eagle feathers are an integral part of his worship activities in the
Native American Church. Mr. Wilgus claimed to regularly use the feathers in
religious ceremonies on the Paiute reservation.42 Thus, Mr. Wilgus asserted
that his adoption into the Paiute tribe entitles him to fully practice the tenets
of the Native American church, including the right to freely exercise his
religion by using the eagle feathers in religious ceremonies. The use of
feathers, argued Mr. Wilgus, is an essential element in his religious practices
in the Native American Church. He further contended that his beliefs were
being unduly burdened by the statute and the underlying permit process, both
of which effectively prohibited his possession of eagle feathers."'
submitted to and successfully passed a referendum vote of the tribal membership pursuant to
Article XI,Section 2(c) of the constitution.
Id. See text infra part 111B (discussing tribe's power to determine membership).
These factors convinced Judge Winder that Mr. Wilgus is "not an Indian." Mims, Can't Have Eagle
Feathers, supra. "Mr.Wilgus must be a descendent of Indian blood lines or a member of a federally
recognized tribe." Id. Judge Winder decided Mr. Wilgus is neither of the two. Id. The judge further
declared that the Native American exemption in the BGEPA is to be interpreted narrowly, as supported by
case law and congressional intent. Id. In short, the judge held that because Mr. Wilgus is not a member of
the Paiute tribe the BGEPA does not unconstitutionally infringe upon his religious freedoms. Id.
After the motion to dismiss was denied, Mr. Wilgus entered a conditional plea of guilty, in order to facilitate
his appeal of the denied motion to the 10th Circuit. Mims, Cant' Have Eagle Feathers,supra. Mr. Orifici
plans to appeal both the religious exercise claim and the level of scrutiny applied to the BGEPA. Id. The
court applied a lower level of scrutiny instead of strict scrutiny that Mr. Orifici contends is the proper
standard to apply. Id.
40. Motion to Dismiss at 3-4.
41. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2. Judge Winder's comments made before his ruling to deny
the motion to dismiss acknowledged the sincerity of Mr. Wilgus' religious beliefs. Mims, Can'tHave
Eagle Feathers,supra note 39.
42. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 3.
43. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4 (contending that Mr. Wilgus's free exercise rights have
been violated). It would appear, however, that Mr. Wilgus can only attack the statute, as applied to him, in
order to escape the penalties for possessing the feathers without a permit. See id. (attacking constitutionality
of the BGEPA). It is not clear whether Mr. Wilgus could also attack the permit process and the regulations
by which it is administered because he did not apply for a permit, thus, he would not have standing. See
United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1242 n.4 (D. Or. 1996) (denying standing to challenge
permit); United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269, 277 (D. Nev. 1986) (recognizing
that failure to apply for permit precludes standing); Madsen v. Boise State Univ., 976 F.2d 1219, 1220-21
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff lacks standing to challenge a rule or policy to which he has not
submitted himself by actually applying for the desired benefit) cited in Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378. Generally,
this is the law, but there is an exception: the doctrine of futility.
The futility doctrine may be applicable for some parties, like Mr. Wilgus, who face a threshold
standing inquiry. A number of courts "have excused on grounds of futility the threshold standing
requirement that the plaintiff submit to the policy being challenged by applying for the benefit regulated by
that policy." United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (N.D. Ca. 1998); see also Jackson-Bey v.
Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1096 (2nd Cir. 1997) (recognizing futility as an exception to standing). The
establishment of futility requires a substantial showing that an adverse decision by the agency is a certainty.
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B. Recognizing the Substance
Mr. Wilgus's case raises a number of interesting issues regarding adoption
into a Native American tribe. This article will address only two of these
issues. One, whether a Native American tribe's sovereign power permits it to
adopt non-Native Americans into the tribe or to affiliate with non-members of
the tribe to such a high degree that the individual should be recognized as a
"quasi-member" of the tribe. And two, the scope of the free exercise rights
and privileges of adoptees or affiliates." This article will analyze these two
issues in the context of an adoptee's or affiliate's right to obtain permits to
possess eagle feathers under the BGEPA by virtue of membership in or
affiliation with a tribe and because the feathers are being used for religious
purposes.45
Part 2 of this article briefly discusses the purposes, proscriptions, and
underlying regulations of the BGEPA. Part 3 sets forth the development and
modem understanding of the notion of tribal sovereignty as it pertains to tribal
membership. Part 4 describes the interplay between the BGEPA, tribal
membership law, and the free exercise rights of adoptees or affiliates. Part 5
contends that the BGEPA and the regulations that govern the administration
of permits under the BGEPA, as interpreted by the courts, deny the right of
free exercise to legitimate adoptees and affiliates of the tribe. Moreover, the
See Randolph- Sheppard Vendors of Am. v. Weinberger, 795 F.2d 90, 105 (D.C. Cir.1986) (stating futility
depends on certainty of adverse decision).
An adoptee or affiliate, like Mr. Wilgus, might have a colorable claim against the permit process
by virtue of the futility exception to the standing requirements. For example, Mr. Wilgus did not apply for
a permit, but if he had, it is unlikely that the agency issuing the permit would have entertained his request.
He is not ethnologically an Indian and is not on the tribal roll. Consequently, Mr. Wilgus cannot meet the
threshold requirements to obtain a permit. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(2) (requiring that an applicant "attach
a certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that is federally recognized"). The regulation further states
that one of the criteria that may be considered for determining eligibility is whether "the applicant is an
Indian who is authorized to participate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies." 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(2).
Because it is almost certain that Mr. Wilgus's application process would be futile, he would probably be able
to escape the standing requirement and mount an attack against the permit process.
It would not be surprising, however, if a court rejected the futility argument because, theoretically, it may
be possible for an adoptee, like Mr. Wilgus, to obtain a permit. If the individual was duly enrolled in a
federally recognized tribe, his permit application may be approved. Furthermore, the individual's status as
an "Indian" is not necessarily the determinative factor in a permit application. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(2). The
agency is authorized to consider whether the individual is an "Indian" when determining eligibility for the
permit. An individual's status as an "Indian" can be interpreted as one of many factors for consideration
and not as a mandatory requirement. If an adoptee applies for a permit, conceivably, the application may
be accepted. For these reasons, a futility argument may fail.
44. A discussion of all the rights and privileges of adoptees would be informative and intriguing;
however, this paper will address only the rights of qualified adoptees or affiliates to possess eagle feathers.
The underlying law and rationale supporting this narrow focus may be applicable in analyzing other rights
and privileges of such claimants.
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (authorizing permits to Native Americans for religious purposes).
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current BGEPA regulations allow the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
to consider the applicant's status as an Indian, thus providing the government
with an opportunity to make invidious decisions in this religious arena on
account of race. 4
This article will conclude that the BGEPA and the regulations by which
it is administered, as applied to adopted non-Native Americans or affiliates of
a tribe, are unnecessarily restrictive and inconsistent with the goals and
purposes of the BGEPA. To remedy this problem, this article proposes that
the underlying regulations of the BGEPA should be amended to delete the
certification of tribal enrollment requirement and instead grant permits to those
individuals who are recognized by the tribe. A written endorsement from a
duly authorized tribal leader will be necessary to obtain a permit.
This amendment will ensure that the substantive concerns embodied in the
Native American exemption are well served, and will also safeguard the
applicant from the risk that the government will improperly use race as a proxy
for religious beliefs. Furthermore, such an amendment will allow the tribe to
effectively determine who is eligible for a permit, by deciding whether to
endorse or include the applicant's name on the tribal rolls. The tribe is in a
better position than the government to evaluate the religious convictions of
their members or associates, thereby ensuring that eagle feathers are only
provided to deserving applicants. The proposed amendment is consistent with
the Executive Memorandum issued by President Clinton, urging governmental
bodies to allow the tribes greater participatory roles in governmental functions
where Native American affairs are involved.47 In short, the ability of the tribe
to participate in and regulate, to some degree, the administration of the permits
under the BGEPA will likewise enhance and protect tribal sovereignty.48
H. THE BALD AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT
Enacted in 1940, the Bald Eagle Protection Act (Act) 49 was designed to
protect the bald eagle that was then "threatened with extinction."50 The bald
46. As an additional matter, when adoptees or affiliates of the tribe are prohibited by the BGEPA
from participating with the tribe in religious ceremonies involving eagle feathers, the rights of the tribe to
fully determine the its membership and religious affiliations are similarly violated.
47. See Pres. Mem. of April 29, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 22953 (requesting agencies to "seek
opportunities to accommodate Native American religious practices").
48. See generally U. S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331 (1978) (discussing tribal sovereignty and
noting that tribes have a significant interest in preserving tribal customs and orders).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 668 etseq.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (Enacting Clause of Eagle Protection Act, June 8,1940). Congress further stated
that "by tradition and custom during the life of this Nation, the bald eagle is no longer a mere bird of
biological interest but a symbol of the American ideals of freedom." Id. The population of eagles in the
United States was at one time estimated by the Department of Interior to be between 10,000 and 20,000 for
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eagle, adopted as the national symbol in 1782 by the Continental Congress,
was revered as "symbolic representation of a new nation under a new
government in a new world." 5' This proud symbol of America was slowly
being destroyed in the very country it was chosen to represent.5 2 As the
country has evolved and grown, the presence and proliferation of illegal
poaching, chemicals, pesticides, power lines and land development have
contributed to the decline in eagle numbers.53 In 1962, the Act was amended
to include the golden eagle. 54 The inclusion of golden eagles into the Act was
because young eaglets of golden eagles are difficult to distinguish from bald
eagles; consequently, young bald eagles were mistakenly taken as golden
eagles. 5" Therefore, the act was renamed the Bald and Golden Eagle
56
Protection Act.
A. Proscriptionsunder the BGEPA
The BGEPA prohibits a person, without a permit, to "take, possess, sell,
purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or
import.. .any bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle, or any
golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing
eagles. ''57 The BGEPA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits
to take, possess, and transport eagles or eagle parts when it is compatible with
the preservation of the eagles.58 Permits are available for "religious purposes
of Indian tribes." 59
golden eagles, between 20,000 and 30,000 for bald eagles. United States v. Hetzel, 385 F. Supp.li311, 1314
(W.D. Mo. 1974) (citing S. Rep. No. 92-1159, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 4258 (1972)). The low populations,
together with the fact that only an estimated 600 pairs of northern bald eagles and less than 400 pairs of
southern bald eagles nested in the contiguous United States in 1971, motivated federal protection for the
eagles. id.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (stating findings and purposes of BGEPA).
52. See Antonia M. De Men, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v. Native
American FreeExercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771,779 (1995) (discussing causes leading
to decline in eagle populations and need for federal protection for the eagle).
53. See id. 779, notes 43-52 and accompanying text (describing different factors affecting eagles).
54. See id. at 786.
55. Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L No. 87-884,76 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 668
(1988)).
56. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq. (1988)). The Act is now referred to as the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act.
16 U.S.C. § 668 (1999).
57. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668. The first offense is punishable by up
to one year imprisonment and up to $5000 in fines. Id. Subsequent convictions can carry up to two years
imprisonment and $10,000 in fines. Id. Civil penalties up to $5000 for each offense can also be sought by
the Secretary of the Interior. id.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 668a.
59. Id. The statute also provides permits for other designated purposes, such as: scientific or
exhibition purposes; wildlife or agricultural interests in certain locales; seasonal protection of domesticated
game; falconry; resource development or recovery operations. 16 U.S.C. § 668(b).
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B. Exemptionfor the Religious Purposesof Indian Tribes
Eagles are revered by Native Americans as a most sacred animal. 6 Many
Native Americans believe eagles serve as messengers delivering the prayers
of Native Americans to the Great Spirit.6' In other words, the feathers enable
Native Americans to communicate with the Great Spirit.62 Because they are
a medium for religious dialogue, the feathers are of the upmost importance to
the religious practices of Native Americans.63
Eagle feathers have been analogized to the cross or Bible of some
Christian religions. 64 Eagle feathers are used by Native Americans in
religious activities including "womanhood ceremonies, naming ceremonies,
marriage ceremonies, and burial ceremonies., 65 The use of eagle feathers by
Native Americans from time immemorial in their many ceremonies renders the
feathers irreplaceable, without which, a major portion of Native American
religious practices would be curtailed, if not destroyed.66
In order to accommodate the religious beliefs of Native Americans,
Congress allows Native Americans to obtain a permit to possess eagles and
eagle parts. 67 The process to obtain a permit is set out in the regulations
promulgated under the BGEPA, in 50 C.F.R. § 22.68 The specific process for
Native Americans to obtain the necessary permit to possess eagle feathers is
found in 50 C.F.R. §22.22.69
Permits will only be issued to "members of Indian entities recognized and
eligible to receive services from the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs"... . engaged in religious activities who satisfy all the issuance criteria

60. See De Meo, supra note 52, at 774 (discussing sacred nature of eagles in Native American

religion).
61. See id.
62. Barbara A. Gray, A Question ofSovereignty: ProtectedEagleFeathers For ndian Religious Use,
SOVEREIGNTY SYMPOSIUM Xl, p. 410 (1998).

63. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 741 (1986) (stating that "[almong the many birds held
in superstitious and appreciative regard by the aborigines of North America, the eagle, by reason of its
majestic, solitary, and mysterious nature, became an especial object of worship") (citations omitted). This
view is illustrated by the use of the eagle by Native Americans for religious and esthetic purposes only. Id.
64. De Meo, supra note 52, at 774.
65. Id. at 776. See generally U.S. v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp. 269,
276 (D.Nev. Oct 15, 1986) (recognizing ceremonial use of eagle feathers in Native American religion).
66. See De Meo, supra note, 52 at 774.
67. See United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[tihe legislative
history of the BGEPA reflects the importance of protecting eagles because of their religious significance
to Native Americans").
68. 50 C.F.R. § 22 (listing requirements for "Eagle Permits" generally).
69. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (governing permits for "Indian Religious Purposes").
70. Furthermore, the National Repository is the only legal source to obtain eagle feathers. See De
Meo, supra note 52, at 788 (citing Washington Hearing I) (citations omitted).
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of this section."'" An applicant must answer a number of inquiries in order to
receive a permit, including the following:72
(a)(3) Name of tribe with which applicant is associated,
(a)(4) Name of tribal religious ceremony(ies) for which
required, and
(a)(5) You must attach a certification of enrollment in an Indian tribe that
is federally recognized under the Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of
1994, 25 U.S.C. 479a-1, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994). The certificate must be
signed by the tribal official who is authorized to certify that an individual
is a duly enrolled member of that tribe, and must include the official title
of that certifying official.73
This permit system prevents adoptees or affiliates from possessing the eagle
feathers under 16 U.S.C. § 668a.7 ' The harm caused by an adoptee's or
affiliate's inability to possess eagle feathers is two-fold. The obvious harm is
that the individual is not free to practice the religion of his or her choice.
When a permit is withheld due to blind adherence to formalities- whether the
applicant's name is present on a roll of a federally recognized tribe- the
substance of the issue is neglected and the purposes of the law are not fully
served. Furthermore, when the agency is afforded discretion to evaluate race
in determining eligibility for a religious exemption, there is the potential for
an unjustified infringement on the free exercise rights of the applicant.
The second mischief, although not discussed in this article, is visited upon
the tribe when a non-Native American with whom the tribe seeks to enjoy
religious association is denied access to feathers for ceremonial purposes.
When this happens the tribe is not free to religiously associate with other
adherents of its religion. In this respect, the tribe's ability to determine and
enjoy tribal membership and affiliation is curtailed by governmental
regulation.76
71. De Meo, supra note 52, at 786. To receive a permit the applicant (not a tribe) must submit a
request for a permit to the Regional Director and furnish all the requested information found in subparts
22.22 and 13.12(a). Id. Each application enables the applicant to request one eagle or the equivalent parts
thereof, but the waiting list can be up to 700 people and may take up to two years to be processed. See De
Meo, supra note 52, at 786 n. 107 (citing various congressional hearings) (citations omitted). A permit may
be denied for a number of reasons, including a previous conviction under the BGEPA. 50 C.F.R. § 13.21.
Ifa permit is denied, administrative review is available for the applicant to seek reconsideration. 50 C.F.R.
§ 13.29.
72. The criteria listed above are only those that are relevant to the issues in this article.
73. 50 C.F.R. § 13.29
74. 16 U.S.C. § 668.
75. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (stating it is "immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest

scrutiny").
76. See generally Masayesva for and on Behalf of Hopi Indian Tribe v. Zah, 792 F. Supp. 1178, 1188
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III. SOVEREIGNTY AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE TRIBE

Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power to~regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes. 7 Since Indian tribes are listed with
foreign nations and the several states, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
tribes are, or should be, analogues of the other two; and thus, tribes hold a
constitutional position equal to a state or foreign nation.7' This is not the case,
however.
I will briefly discuss the principles developed by the courts that delineate
the tribes' sovereign power under our government. These principles are not
only the product of the courts, but have stemmed from treaties, statutes, and
administrative regulations as well.79
The foundation for much of our modem Indian Law is based on Justice
Marshall's well-known trilogy of Johnson v. M'Intosh,80 Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,8' and Worcester v. Georgia. 2 These cases define the status and
sovereignty of the tribes and the power of the government over the tribes.8 3
In Johnson, the question presented was whether a conveyance of lands by
tribal chiefs to non-Indians was a valid transaction, one recognizable by the
courts.' Justice Marshall relied upon the doctrine of discovery to hold the
conveyance invalid." Marshall stated that Indians had a right to possession
and use but that "their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations,
(1992) ("The right to define membership is a right central to the existence of an Indian tribe.") (citations
omitted).
77. Felix S. Cohen, FEL~x S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,91 (1986). In fact,
Cohen points out that "there is excellent authority for the view that Congress has no Constitutional power
over Indians except what is conferred by the commerce clause and other clauses of the constitution." Id.
at 90. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl.
3. "The Commerce Clause is the only grant of power in the Federal
Constitution which mentions Indians." See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832) (stating the
provisions of the Constitution "comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the
Indians"). Marshall's view of the government's plenary power over the Indian tribes became the general
rule, as will be shown below.
78. See Cohen v. Uttle Six Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 388 (Ct. App. Minn. 1996) (Randall, dissenting)
(citing LONE WOLF V. HrrCHCOCK, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) holding that Indian tribes are not true
sovereigns like Canada, Mexico, or Great Britain); Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,551-552, 554(1832)

(discussing limited sovereign attributes of Indian nations).
79. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978) (recognizing treaties

and statutes as sources for "judicially made Indian law").
80. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
81. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).

82. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
83. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 451
(1989) (recognizing limited sovereignty of the tribe as developed in the Marshall trilogy).
84. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).

85. Id. at 572-73.
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were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle, that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it."86 Whatever merits the
Johnson holding has, it, together with the two aforementioned cases, laid the
foundation that eventually formed the bedrock that is federal Indian law.87
In Cherokee Nation,88 the tribe sought to be defined as a foreign nation,89
so as to fall under Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which allows
diversity jurisdiction between a "State" and "foreign States." 9 Again, Justice
Marshall decided against the tribe by holding that the Cherokee Nation was not
a "foreign state." 9' In so doing, Justice Marshall took the opportunity to
describe the unique status of the tribe. Marshall explained that "[t]he
condition of the Indian in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike any
other two people in existence;" it is a relationship "marked by peculiar and
cardinal distinctions which exist no where else." 92 The relationship was
described to be "that of a ward to his guardian," because the tribes were
viewed, at least in the Court's eyes, as "domestic dependant nations." 93
Worcester v. Georgia9' dealt with the conviction of a white missionary
under a Georgia statute that prohibited his residing on Cherokee land without
a state license and an oath to defend the laws of Georgia. 95 The issue
presented was whether the state statute was unconstitutional.96 While striking
down the statute by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, Justice Marshall again
elaborated on Indian sovereignty, stating that the Cherokee Nation was a
distinct community outside the reach of Georgia law, absent consent by the
86. Id. at 574. Justice Marshall further stated that the Indians' title could only be extinguished by
the United States through conquest or purchase. Many believe, and perhaps rightly so, that the discovery
doctrine is extremely vulnerable to criticism. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American

Government, 31 ARIZ. L REV. 365 (decrying government's assumed power over the tribes).
87. AMERICAN INDIAN LAw DESKBOOK I (Joseph P. Mazurek chair editing committee, Univ. Press
of Colo. 1998).

88. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1.
89.

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.

90. See U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 1. The tribe claimed, inter alia, that Georgian laws allowed the
state to seize and use Cherokee lands: no federal question was presented. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)

at I.
91. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. That the Cherokee Nation is not a "foreign state" relating to jurisdictional
purposes may leave open the possibility that for other purposes a different conclusion may be reached. See
e.g. Tribal Sovereignty Upheld, DOI Home page (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://doi.gov/bia.html>
(discussing District Court of Montana's affirming EPA's approval of confederation of tribes' application
for treatment-as-states status under the Clean Water Act).
92. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
93. Id. at 17-18. The opinion further declared that "[the Indians] and their country are considered
by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of
the United States, that any attempt to acquire lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility." Id. at 17-18.
94. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
95. Id. at 536-41.
96. Id. at 536.
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tribe or by operation of treaties or acts of Congress.97 Marshall further
explained that the "whole power of regulating the intercourse with [the United
States and the Cherokee nation]... was vested in the United States."98
These three cases lay out the "anomalous" position of the tribe as viewed
by our federal and state governments.99 The Marshall opinions established that
Congress has plenary authority to regulate the tribe. '0 This authority comes
from the Indian Commerce Clause and numerous treaties entered into between
the various tribes and the United States.101
However, with this power comes responsibility; indeed, there exists a
"general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people."'' 0 2
This relationship originates from the "guardian-ward" status that Marshall
described in Cherokee Nation 0 3 Even though the application of the trust
doctrine has not always been obvious,'t ° it has been used to justify hiring
07
6
preferences,'0 5 land disputes (e.g., accretion)," hunting and fishing rights,'
and perhaps most importantly, the favorable statutory interpretation that
Indians enjoy. 0 8 Statutes are to be construed as an Indian would understand
97. Id. at 559-60.
98. Id. at 560. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (stating "[tihe sovereignty
that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character [which] exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.").
99. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,381 (1886) (stating that CherrokeeNation and Worcester
set out United States' position that native Americans " were, and always have been regarded asking a semiindependent position where they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people." Id. at 581-82).
100. See Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376 (Ct. App. Minn. 1996) (recognizing that
Marshall's cases stand for plenary congressional power over tribes).
101. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
102. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell II]. See also United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (hereinafter Mitchell 1]. Both Mitchell I and H involved the
question whether the federal government could be held liable for the mismanagement of timber resources
on the reservation. The court, in Mitchell 1,excluded the management of resources from the government's
duty. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 542. One dissenter disagreed, finding a fiduciary duty in the language of the
statute considered in the case. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). On remand, the Court referenced more
modern statutes to bolster the general fiduciary relationship between the government and the tribe and the
existence of a duty was affirmed. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 226.
103. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)l, 17 (1831).
104. See Amy Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1565 (1994) (stating the Indian trust doctrine "has not yet
matured" to a state of certainty and constancy across a variety of circumstances).
105. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (relating to section 12 of the Indian Reorganization
Act, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 472). The Court further explained that the hiring preference was "not directed
towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized'
tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially classified as 'Indians.' In this sense, the
preference is political rather than racial in nature." Id. at 553 n. 24.
106. See Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (discussing Native American tribe's
action to quiet title).
107. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (stating Indian hunting and fishing rights are
preserved absent clearly stated provisions in treaties or by acts of Congress).
108. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (noting that rules of
statutory construction relating to Indian law stems from trust relationship). See also Choctaw Nation of
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them and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the tribe; however, this
beneficial cannon of statutory construction does not summarily trump clear
congressional intent, surrounding circumstances, and legislative history.'0 9
Recognizing the favored status that Indians enjoy due to their unique
relationship is essential to fully understanding the many nuances of Indian
law." 0 One major aspect of Indian law effected by this peculiar relationship
is tribal membership."'
A. Tribal Self-Government
In Worcester, the corpus of law concerning tribal sovereignty, which was
introduced in Cherokee Nations, is further expounded upon by Justice
Marshall." 2 Justice Marshall expressly stated that Indian tribes "had always
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights."''13 Analogizing to international law, Marshall affirmed
that a weaker nation does not give up its rights to self-governance by merely
relying on a stronger nation for protection."" Thus, unlike the powers of the
federal government, which are delegated by the people," 5 the sovereign
powers of the Indian tribes' exist by virtue of the inherent sovereignty that the
tribes enjoy based on original natural rights." 6
It is now commonly accepted that Indian self-government extends into
both criminal and civil law," 7 and controls issues regarding property and
Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943) (stating that when "interpreting treaties and agreements
with the Indians; they are to be construed, so far as possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood
them, and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests
of a dependent people") (quotations omitted).
109. See Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 432 (recognizing numerous factors affecting statutory
interpretation).
110. It is important to remember that when legislatures use the word "Indian," it is usually in reference
to the group of people that hold this unique status with the govemmenL The reference is to a political body,
not a member of a racial minority group. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977)
(declaring that federal regulation of Indians is not legislation of racial groups but of political communities);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (noting Indian is a referent to political groups); United States v.
Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating "the term 'Indian' describes a political group or
membership, not a racial group").
111. See Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1181,
1188-89 (1983) (asserting that if trust relationship were to end, Indians would lose legal status and be no
different than other state citizens).
112. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
113. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
114. Id.at 560-61.
115. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (stating that "the people have an
original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected").
116. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet) at 580 (recognizing attributes of Indian sovereignty).
117. See Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897) (stating that valid adoption of white man by
tribe deprived federal courts of jurisdiction over murder case and left case to tribal courts.).
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inheritance," 8 taxation," 9 domestic and family law,' 20 and tribal
membership. 12 ' All 22of these areas are subject to divestment per the plenary
power of Congress.
B. Determining Tribal Membership
The determination of tribal membership is not always clear and is often
An individual, for example, may be
quite difficult to ascertain.'23
ethnologically an Indian, a blood-descendent of a Native American tribe, but
not be legally recognized as an Indian by the government or the tribe."2
Similarly, a member of a non-Native American ethnotype may be deemed a
legal Indian, even though ethnologically that person is clearly not Native
American.125 The factors that determine one's status in the tribe are diverse,
such as in- or voluntary withdrawal from a tribe;2 6 location of one's residence
on or off the reservation; 2 7 and the association
with a Native American
2
community in which the individual resides.

118. 25 U.S.C. § 184 (codifying Indian property rights of offspring of white man and Indian woman
are dependent upon tribes recognizing the woman as member of tribe). The field of tribal property is
regulated by Congress and the Secretary of the Interior. Statutes enacted by Congress authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to keep rolls and review tribal membership represent one aspect of government
involvement in tribal activities. This activity is viewed, at least by Congress, as a result of the trust
relationship between the two parties and is intended to be beneficial to the Indians.
119. See Cohen, supra note 76. (stating Indian tribes retain necessary sovereign power to levy taxes,
unless Congress dictates otherwise).
120. See id. at 145 (recognizing tribe's power to regulate marriage of its members). See also United
States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605 (1916) (stating that "bigamy, polygamy, incest, adultery or fornication,
which in terms refers to Indians, these matters always having been left to the tribal customs and laws").
121. See id., at 133 (declaring that "in the absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary,
an Indian tribe has complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership"); Patterson v.
Council of Seneca Nation, 157 N.E. 734,738 (1927) (stating that "Seneca Nation retains for itself the power
of determining who are Senecas").
122. See COHEN, Federal Indian Law, at 133 (noting Congressional power as a limit on tribes power).
123. See id. at 137 (stating that tribal membership law, "has been and is being exercised along widely
divergent lines").
124. See Gray, supra note 61, at 427 (discussing loss of legal Indian status of Native American
woman, Delia Cook). Delia Cook has a blood quantum that is 100% Native American. Id. at 427. She,
however, lost her status as an Indian because she withdrew her name, for religious reasons, from the tribal
roles. Id. Cf Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1278 (N.D. Ohio 1994)
(recognizing that although Indian may not be member of a tribe, "he is [still] a member of a protected
class"). For Equal Protection purposes, however, tribal membership is not determinative of one's status as
an Indian. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1278.
125. See Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897) (recognizing that statutory jurisdiction limited
to offenses between tribal members was satisfied even when one of the individuals in question was white
man adopted into Indian tribe and was thus legally Indian).
126. Id.
127. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,647 (1977) (stating that residency on the reservation
and continued relations with tribe are indicative of tribal membership).
128. id.
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Felix Cohen, summarized two general qualifications for determining
whether an individual is to be legally recognized as an Indian. 29 One criteria
is "[tihat some of his ancestors lived in America before its discovery by the
white race."'130 The other factor is "that the individual is considered an 'Indian'
by the community in which he lives."' 3 ' Even these general rules, however,
are subject to the specific provisions the tribe has adopted to determine its
membership. 32 Unsurprisingly, exceptions to these general rules are
numerous. For example, tribal customs have been determinative of the
question of membership, thus allowing individuals, not Native American by
blood, to become members of the tribe through adoption. 133 When tribal laws
or customs are not clear on the issue of membership, courts have relied on the
34
tribal chief to settle the matter.
There is a distinction to be recognized between membership for tribal
matters versus other incidents involving governmental agency action.
According to UnitedStates v. Rogers, 35 a white man adopted into a tribe could
not divest the courts of jurisdiction over him as a white man, an exception
being "confined to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians are
regarded as belonging to their race."'13 This case has been interpreted to mean
"that for purposes in which the tribe has the last word, tribal adoption is valid
without reference to departmental approval."'' 3' However, "for those purposes
in which departmental actions are authorized, the department may demand the
right to approve or disapprove [the] adoption.' 38 Thus, an individual's status
as an Indian may depend in large part on circumstance. In other words, an
adoptee may be considered by the government as a member of the tribe in
some contexts, but not in others.

129. See COHEN, supra note 76, at 2.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Patterson v. Council of Seneca Nation, 157 N.E. 734 (N.Y. 1927) (recognizing tribe's
constitution in determining membership).
133. See Waldron v. United States, 143 F. 413, 419 (C.C.S.D. 1905) (noting that "usages and
customs" can define membership despite contrary holding by Interior Department). The court also stated
"that the common law does not obtain among said tribes" as to the determination of race of children of white
husband and Indian wife. Id. See also Nofire, 164 U.S. at 658 (recognizing that a white man can be
adopted into the Cherokee Nation); Alberty v. United States, 162 U. S.499, 502-03 (1896) (holding that
courts of Indian Nations have jurisdiction over offenses committed by one Indian upon the person of
another, including statutes of both Indians by birth and Indians by adoption).
134. See Hy-yu-tse-mil-kin v. Smith, 194 U.S. 401, 403 (1904) (noting tribal chief s role in
determining tribal membership).
135. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 Howe.) 567 (1846).
136. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 Howe.) at 572.
137. COHEN, supra note 121, at 136.
138. Id. at 136.
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IV. FREE EXERCISE FORADOPTEES AND AFFILIATES
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[c]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' 39 A discussion of an adoptee's free
exercise claim is subject to substantially different forms of analysis depending
on the source relied upon to provide the applicable standard.' 40 The standard
set forth in Employment Division,Departmentof Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith applies a low level of scrutiny to free exercise claims based on
generally applicable statutes.' 41 Smith held that a neutral or generally
applicable statute did not offend the First Amendment,
even if the statute
42
incidentally burdened the free exercise of religion.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 43 was enacted,
among other reasons, to "restore" the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner.'" Specifically, RFRA prohibited the government from
substantially burdening one's exercise of religion, even if the burden was
based on a generally applicable statute, unless the government demonstrated
that the burden furthered a compelling government
interest and was the least
45
restrictive means of furthering that interest.
An appropriate question is what standard is applicable to the free exercise
claim of an adoptee or affiliate. For example, the U.S. Attorney, who tried
Mr. Wilgus's case, contended tiiat the proper standard to apply is the one set
forth in Smith.146 The U.S. Attorney's position, however, ignored current free
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
140. Compare Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85
(1990) (holding that neutral or generally applicable statute could be applied to religious practices even
without support by. compelling governmental interest) with Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb through 2000bb-4 (1994) (prohibiting "[g]ovemment" from "substantially
burden[ing]" person's exercise of religion even if burden results from rule of general applicability unless
government can demonstrate burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that ...interest.") cited in City of Boeme v. Flores, 511 U.S. 507,
511 (1997) (concluding that statute exceeded Congress' power as applied to the states)..
141. Employment Div., Dep't 'ofHuman Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990)
(holding that test balancing substantial burden to religious practice against compelling governmental interest
did not apply to challenges to generally applicable criminal prohibitions on particular forms of conduct).
142. See id. at 884-85.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 2000bb-4 (1994).
144. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Under the Sherberttest the court must inquire whether
the law at issue substantially burdens a religious practice and, if so, whether the burden is justified by a
compelling government interest. Id., at 403-09.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (restoring Sherbert test).
146. See Response to Motion to Dismiss at 3-5 (asserting that applicable standard was found in Smith)
United States v. Wilgus, No. 2:99CR00047W (D.Utah 1999). The U.S Attorney bolstered this argument
by pointing out that the RFRA standard was struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521, 511 U.S. 507
(1997), which also reaffirmed Smith, supra note 141. This argument was persuasive to the District Court
of Utah; however, recent Circuit Courts indicate that the argument is mistaken. See infra note 148
(discussing validity of RFRA as to federal laws).
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exercise jurisprudence handed down by the circuit courts after City of Boerne
v. Flores. 47 Recent circuit court decisions stand for the proposition that the
Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to state and local law, notfederal
law.' 4 The BGEPA is federal law.' 49 Thus, RFRA may still be viable and
binding on the BGEPA, at least in some circuits.'"'
If so, for the statute to withstand the scrutiny imposed by RFRA, the
government must show that the burdens imposed on an adoptee's or affiliate's
beliefs further a compelling government interest and are carried out in the
least restrictive means to serve that end.' 5 ' Before reaching that inquiry, the
complaining party must establish that the regulation of eagle feathers
substantially interferes with the exercise of religious beliefs." 2 The court's
function in this inquiry is to ascertain the sincerity of the belief and its
religious nature. 53 Adoptees prevented from using the feathers must establish
that this burden imposed by the BGEPA is more than inconvenient to their
religious 4 practices--that it is, in fact, a burden central to the adoptees'
5
beliefs.1
As demonstrated above, eagle feathers are vital to Native American
worship. 5 Native Americans require the use of feathers to practice their
147. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
148. See Adams v. Comm'r, 170F.3d 173, 175n. 1(3d Cir. 1999),cert.denied, 528 U.S. 1117 (2000)
(stating "[i]n general, courts that have addressed the question of the constitutionality have founded that
RFRA is constitutional as applied to the federal government"); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir.
1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998) (stating that "[t]he [City of Boerne] Court did not reach any decision
as to the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal law"and citing H.R. REP.No. 103-88, at 17 (1993)
to show Congress' belief that the power to enact RFRA as applied to the federal government was pursuant
to the "Necessary and Proper Clause embodied in Aiticle I. Seciion 8 of the Constitution"); Peterson v.
Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (declaring that City of Boerne held that RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to state governments). See also Gibson v. Babbitt. 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11 th
Cir. 2000) (applying RFRA to free exercise claim made against BGEPA).
But see In re Young, 141 F.3d at 863-64 (Bogue, J., dissenting) (citing City of Boerne and arguing that
RFRA was unconstitutional even as applied to federal law because it invaded judicial province to interpret
constitutional guarantees of First Amendment).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994) (criminalizing commercial use of American bald eagles).
150. See supra note 148 (discussing validity of RFRA as to federal laws).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (permitting government substantially to burden exercise of religion
only if burden furhters compelling government interest and is least restrictive means of furthering it).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) & (3) (finding that laws neutral toward religion sometimes burden
religious exerxcise but should not do so substantially unless compelling justification exists.
153. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476 (2nd Cir.1996) (stating that "[o]ur scrutiny extends only
to whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief and whether the belief is religious in nature"); but
see Rossi v. Portuondo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting that City of Boerne declared
unconstitutional the statutory scheme under which Jolly was decided). Anything beyond that limited
inquiry is inappropriate and beyond the court's purview. Jolly, 76 F.3d at 476. See Thomas v. Review Bd.
of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (stating that "it is not within the judicial
function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioners or his fellow worker more correctly
perceived the commands of their common faith.").
154. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commn of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (requiring
substantial burden); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
155. See supra Part H B.
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religion. 5 6 Once an adoptee has established that the statute places a.
substantial burden on the adoptee's ability to practice
religion, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate a compelling
government interest in not exempting this person.'
To determine whether the government has a compelling interest in.
preserving eagles under the BGEPA, "it is useful to look first at the importance
of the value underlying the regulation, and second, at the degree of proximity
and necessity that the chosen regulation bears to the underlying value."' 58 The
BEGPA involves two governmental interests, only one of which is compelling.
Courts have held that the government's interest in preserving eagles is
compelling.'
The second interest of the BGEPA is to preserve the Native
American religion. 16 Although it has been argued that the removal of the bald
eagle from the endangered species list weakens the government's interest in
protecting the eagles below that of protecting a complainant's religious
6
freedoms, this argument has not been successful.1 '
The need for governmental regulation of eagles is commonly accepted by
the courts. 62 The next step in the RFRA strict scrutiny analysis requires a
strong nexus between the regulation and the government interest. 63 This
nexus is premised on the underlying objective of the BGEPA- "to prevent the
illegal killing of eagles by discouraging an excessive demand for their parts"
-and on the assumption that "the compelling interest can be furthered only
by criminalization of the possession of eagle parts."''
An adoptee or affiliate must therefore attack the statute as violating the
least restrictive means inquiry. Some courts have held, without much
discussion, that the permit system is the least restrictive means of furthering
the government's interests under the BGEPA. 65 However, Callahanv. Woods
stated a test for this inquiry."
"If the compelling state goal can be

156. See supra Part 11B.
157. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11 th Cir. 2000) (shifting burden to government).
158. Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1274(9th Cir. 1984).
159. See United States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (D. Or. 1996) (recognizing compelling
interest in eagle preservation).
160. See id. at 1243 (recognizing the government's interest in "preserving access to eagle parts" by
Indians).
161. See Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. at 1241-43 (analyzing merits of government's interest in preserving
eagle and concluding that it was still compelling). The court noted the slow maturation of the eagles,
susceptibility to illegal poaching, and the fact that the eagle was still a threatened species. See id. at 1241.
162. See id. at 1241.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1242.
165. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with district court that
government's interest in eagle preservation was compelling and that permit system was least restrictive
means for furthering government's interest).
166. Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1984).
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accomplished despite the exemption of a particular individual, then a
regulation which denies an exemption is not the least restrictive means of
furthering the state interest. A synthesis of the two prongs is... whether the
government has a compelling interest in not exempting a religious individual
from a particular regulation.' 67
The defendant in Lundquist, although not enrolled in a federally
recognized tribe, urged the court to exempt non-enrolled persons of Native
American descent from the BGEPA. The Lundquist court found that allowing
this broad exemption from the prohibitions of the BGEPA would undermine
the purpose of the act. 168 The court further noted the "government's interest in
preserving Native American religion, the limited supply of eagle feathers and
parts, and the high demand by eligible Native Americans, which has already
caused long waits and a burden on the free exercise of religion. '"'69 A
combination of the above factors coupled with the potential for an unlimited
number of people asserting claims similar to Lundquist' s was too much for the
court to accept a least restrictive means argument. 70 The court concluded that
the proposed exemption was unlike Callahan.'71 In Callahan "the cost of
exempting one individual from the numbering system had not been shown by
the government, and actually appeared, in common sense, to be fairly
slight.' ' 72 In Lundquist, however, "the cost of exempting all Indians from the
regulatory procedures would be disastrous to the eagles, in that their numbers
could be severely reduced."' 171 In short, Lundquist's proposed exemption was
too broad and founded upon speculation."74
An adoptee's or affiliate's least restrictive means argument does not suffer
from the same fatal flaws as Lundquist' s. First, adoptees and affiliates are not
seeking a broad exemption to the statutory scheme. Indeed, the possession of
feathers under the BGEPA will still require a permit.'75 The government can
still ensure that the feathers are obtainable only by those who will truly use the
eagle parts for religious reasons. 76 Because a presumably small number of
167. Callahan, 736 F.2d at 1272-73 cited in Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. at 1242.
168. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. at 1243 (emphasizing two government interests at stake, preserving
eagles and preserving Native American religion).
169. Id.
170. See id. (mentioning "that the practice of Native American religion is not restricted to a very few
individuals").
171. See id.
172. United States v. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F.Supp. 269, 277 (D. Nev.
1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir 1987), cited in Lundquist, 932 F.Supp. at 1243.
173. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F.Supp. at 277, cited in Lundquist, 932 F.Supp. at 1243.
174. See Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. at 1242-43.
175. Under my proposed amendment, however, the permit for adoptees will be dependant on an
endorsement from the tribe, through an authorized leader.
176. The allegation that Mr. Wilgus received all of his feathers from Native Americans, who were
trying to provide a means for him to worship, is illustrative of the ability and desire of Native Americans
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individuals are situatued similarly to Mr. Wilgus, the fear of substantially
increasing demand for an already scarce supply of feathers is unfounded.
Furthermore, a requirement that ranking members of a tribe corroborate the
adoption or affirmation via a written endorsement-as opposed to selfproclaimed membership-diminishes considerably the threat of eagles being
exploited for non-religious purposes.,
Moreover, as mentioned above, the legal definition of Indian denotes
affiliation with a political body-the tribe.77 The race of an adoptee or affiliate
should have little, if any, bearing
on the individual's eligibility to possess
1 79
purposes.
religious
for
feathers
The BGEPA exempts from the general proscriptions the use of eagle
feathers by Indian tribes for religious purposes.' Currently, the permit, which
enables one lawfully to possess eagle feathers, is available to listed members
of federally recognized tribes. '' The existence of one's name on a list predicts
holding religious beliefs in accordance with the beliefs protected by the
BGEPA 2 Except for the mere presence of a name on a tribal roll of a
federally recognized tribe, an adoptee or affiliate, like Mr. Wilgus, is in all
relevant respects like the Native Americans whose beliefs the act protects. The
statute's and regulation's refusal to accommodate the religious beliefs of such
individuals, whose beliefs are strikingly similar to those Native Americans
eligible for permits under the BGEPA, illustrates the underinclusiveness of the
BGEPA.8 3
To be sure, the BGEPA was established to preserve and respect religious
practices and beliefs of "Indian tribes."18 4 To serve these ends, administrators
should apply the statute with an eye to substance (presence and conviction of
respectfully and properly to provide non-Native Americans with eagle feathers for religious purposes.
177. In fact, the written endorsement may prove useful in preventing non-religious Native Americans
from obtaining eagle feathers for ulterior purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486, 487
(9th Cir. 1976) (discussing conviction of two Native Americans for attempting to sell eagle parts to
undercover Fish and Wildlife agents for purported resale to east coast collectors).
178. See supra note 68 (referring to Indians as a political unit and not as racial group)
179. See Morrison v. Garraghty, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1754, *34-36 (4th Cir. Feb. 7,2001) (holding
that penitentiary's decision to deny white inmate access to various religious articles that were available to
qualifying Native Americans was unconstitutional denial of equal protection).
180. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1994) (empowering Secretary of Interior to authorize taking of eagles for
religious purposes of Indian tribes).
181. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (2001) (describing requirements concerning permits for Indian
religious purposes).
182. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1994) (defining religious beliefs in terms of membership in tribe). One
of the purposes of the BGEPA is to preserve Native American religion, and this is carried out by allowing
members of Native American tribes to possess eagle feathers. Obviously, the inference is that members of
the tribe hold beliefs in harmony with the Native American religion.
183. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993)
(finding ordinance not narrowly tailored because it was both overbroad and underinclusive).
184. See 16 U.S.C. § 688a (1994) (creating exemption for religious purposes of Native American
tribes).
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religious beliefs in harmony with the exemption in the BGEPA) and not
formalism (presence or absence of a name on a list). We need an allocation
system based on substantive criteria because blind allegiance to formalism
denies access to eagle feathers to individuals who would be eligible for permits
but for the absence of their name from a mere list.'85
And perhaps even more objectionably, permits may be denied solely
because the government can give weight to the status of the applicant as an
"Indian." In this instance, race substituting for religious beliefs, and the
correlation is not necessarily present.' 86 When the Native American religious
exemption of the BGEPA is not carried out in a manner to serve the ends for
which it was created, modifications are necessary. Amending the regulations
that govern the permit system would end the arbitrary manner in which permits
are or are not issued to those deserving applicants. VI. ProposedAmendments
to C.F.R. § 22
My proposed amendments are rather simple, but ensure a degree of
substantive honesty not found in the BGEPA as presently administered. The
requirement that the applicant "attach a certification of enrollment in an Indian
tribe that is federally recognized"'87 should be deleted. Instead, the regulation
should only require the applicant to present a written endorsement from a tribal
official who is authorized to certify that the individual is a member or religious
affiliate with the tribe. Not only would this provision provide the tribes with
greater say in the regulation of eagle parts for religious purposes, it also
attempts to recognize the religious substance of the permit application.
My second proposed amendment is to remove the Department of the
Interior's ability, under 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(2), to consider the applicants
status as an Indian (race) when issuing permits. As mentioned before, the
correlation between religion and race is not necessarily prefect. Furthermore,
an amendment is warranted based on the mere fact that a threat exists that an
applicant can be denied a permit based on an arbitrary race-based
classification.

185. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1257-58 (1lth Cir. 2000) (denying permit to duly
recognized Native American merely because his name was not on the tribal roll of a federally recognized
tribe).
186. See Morrison v. Garraghty, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1754, * 27-29 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001)
(rejecting relationship between religious beliefs and racial make-up or tribal membership); Combs v.
Corrections Corp. of America, 977 F. Supp. 799, 802 (W.D. La. 1997) (stating that "the policy is akin to a
requirement that practicing Catholics prove an Italian ancestry, or that Muslims trace their roots to
Mohammed"). See also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (stating that "distinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality").
187. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22.
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The religious purposes of the statute are better served by a system that
does not rely on arbitrary indicators of religious affiliation and conviction. It
is better to put the power to govern disbursement of eagle permits in the hands
of the tribe. The tribe is in a better position to evaluate the eligibility of
applicants based on the substance of their religious beliefs. Certainly, this
method would better serve the ends of the Native American exemption in the
BGEPA. The result of these amendments is a greater recognition of free
exercise rights of adoptees and a respectful grant of sovereignty to the tribe in
an area as important as religion.
VI. CONCLUSION

The presence and administration of far reaching governmental regulations
has had the unwelcomed effect of impinging upon the religious practices of
many citizens. Unfortunately, there is no panacea for the afflictions these
regulations place on guaranteed first amendment rights. Yet, some of the
adverse effects of liberty restricting statutes can be easily remedied. The
solution to accommodate the religious freedom asserted by adoptees or
affiliates of Native American tribes is illustrative of this fact.
At present, the BGEPA prohibits possession of eagles or eagle parts unless
the possessor has a valid permit. Permits are available for some Native
Americans who can show a certification of enrollment in a federally
recognized tribe. Furthermore, to obtain a permit the applicant must avoid the
potentially invidious discretionary power of an agency official to consider the
applicants race when deciding whether to issue the permit. For adoptees and
affiliates, like Mr. Wilgus, these criteria are insurmountable. Although, these
individuals believe and practice the tenets of the Native American religion and
associate with the tribe, they are prohibited from possessing feathers, as their
religious beliefs dictate, merely because of an enrollment list, or even worse,
because of their race. The simple amendments I propose would do much to
eliminate the overt oppression on religion, the underinclusiveness of the
current permit system, and the threat of racial classifications to serve as a
proxy for religion that are present in the current administration of the
BGEPA..'8 8

188. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.H., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth out of a multitude of tongues.").

